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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The General Accounting Office and the Department of Health and Human 
Services (the “DHHS”) recently estimated that Medicare pays $23 billion a year in 
fraudulent medical claims.1  Not surprisingly, many health care professionals 
consider Medicare fraud and abuse the leading health care issue in 1999.2  To combat 
the fraud abuse in the system, Congress has recently enacted several new laws and 
given life to some old ones.  For example, Congress recently passed the Stark laws3 
the 1981 Civil Monetary Penalties Law,4 and the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act.5  In addition, the False Claims Act, originally enacted in 1863 
with a qui tam provision, has become a major force in assisting the government in 
discovering and prosecuting fraudulent claims.6  Considerable emphasis has also 
been placed on prosecuting fraud and abuse under the federal Medicare and 
                                                                
1HCFA’s $23 Billion Error Rate Said Shows Need for Random Audits, HEALTH L. REP. 
(BNA) 24. 
2Survey of Top Health Care Law Issues For 1999, HEALTH L. REP. (BNA), (Dec., 1998). 
342 U.S.C.A. § 1395nn (West Supp. 1998).  The Stark legislation consists of The Ethics in 
Patient Referrals Act (Stark I) and The Comprehensive Physician Ownership and Referral Act 
of 1993 (Stark II).  Stark I prohibits physicians from referring Medicare patients to clinical 
laboratories in which the physician has an ownership interest.  Stark II expands the prohibition 
against physician “self-referral” to services such as: radiology services; prosthetics; home 
health services; outpatient prescription drugs; and inpatient and outpatient hospital services.  
For a discussion of the Stark Laws, see Jo-Ellyn Sakowitz Klein, Note, The Stark Laws: 
Conquering Physician Conflicts of Interest? 87 GEO. L.J. 499 (1998). 
442 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320a-27a (West 1981).  “The 1981 Civil Monetary Penalties Law gives 
the Inspector General the authority to seek restitution from anyone who submits a false claim 
to Medicare, Medicaid, or any other federally financed health or welfare program.  Under [this 
law] providers can be fined $2000 per claim and assessed as much as twice the amount of the 
claim.”  See Civil Monetary Penalties, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Apr. 8, 1991, at 38. 
5Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 
Stat. 1936 (1996). (hereinafter “HIPAA”).  HIPAA provided increased funding for the Office 
of Inspector General (OIG) and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to 
investigate fraud and abuse.  HIPAA allocated $70 million to the OIG, money which the 
Office plans to hire 250 additional investigators, auditors, attorneys and other experts.  See 
Colleen Faddick, Health Care Fraud And Abuse:  New Weapons, New Penalties, And New 
Fears for Providers Created by the Health Insurance Portability And Accountability Act of 
1996 (“HIPAA”), 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 77 (1997). 
631 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-3733 (1995).  The False Claims Act (FCA) prohibits individuals 
from knowingly submitting a false claim to the government for money.  The FCA was 
originally enacted prevent contractor fraud perpetrated on the Union Army during the Civil 
War.  Under the FCA, the U.S. Attorney General can bring a civil suit against an individual 
for filing a false claim against the government.  The qui tam provisions of the FCA enable 
private individuals to sue those perpetrating fraud against the government.  The FCA 
provisions encourage individuals to report fraud by allowing private citizens to share in the 
government’s recovery after the defendant is successfully prosecuted or settles.  See, Kaz 
Kikkawa, Medicare Fraud and Abuse and Qui Tam: The Dynamic Duo or the Odd Couple, 8 
HEALTH MATRIX 83 (1998).   
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Medicaid anti-kickback statute.7  This Note examines the recent split in federal 
courts’ interpretation of the scienter requirement of the anti-kickback statute and how 
the Supreme Court’s recent definition of “willfully” in Bryan v. United States,8 will 
impact the mens rea requirement for conviction under the anti-kickback statute.  
State and federal anti-kickback laws aim to prohibit the exchange of 
remuneration for referrals of patients, goods, or services under publicly funded 
health care programs.  The premise of these laws is if a medical professional has a 
financial incentive for referring patients, he is more likely to increase the number of 
services performed.  This incentive, in turn, will lead to an overutilization of 
services, the unnecessarily depletion of program funds, and a waste of taxpayer 
dollars.9  Although many state laws contain similar provisions, this Note focuses 
solely on the federal Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback statute.10 
The anti-kickback statute has been the source of much controversy.  Supporters 
of the law argue that it is necessary to punish providers who would contribute to the 
nation’s spiraling health care costs by placing profit over the best interests of their 
patients.  On the other hand, medical providers fear that the anti-kickback laws will 
punish “innocent” referral arrangements used throughout the industry.  Furthermore, 
it has been argued that these arrangements may ultimately save taxpayers dollars 
because of the efficiencies which they create. 11  For example, if a hospital owns a 
management service organization (MSO) that furnishes support services to a 
                                                                
7As presently amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) and (2).  For purposes of brevity, 
the Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback statute will be referred to herein as the “anti-
kickback statute.” 
8Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998). 
9See James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse in an Evolving Health Care Marketplace:  
Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 Am. J.L. & Med. 205, 209 (1996).  This article 
describes a significant number of studies, primarily from Jean M. Mitchell and Elton Scott, 
that showes when physicians had an ownership interest or a compensation arrangement with 
an ancillary facility, the patients of these physicians had higher utilization rates than did the 
patients of other physicians. 
1042 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320a-7b(b)(1) and (2) (1994).  See discussion infra Sections II A and II 
B.  
11See Blumstein, supra note 9: 
The fraud and abuse statute, enacted before capitation had a large market presence, 
clearly contemplates a world of fee for service (FFS) payment driving excessive 
utilization and escalating program costs.  While this concern remains realistic in much 
of the market, the fraud and abuse law suffers from a case of hardening of the 
intellectual arteries because it does not adequately accommodate the evolving market-
driven reforms in the health care arena.  Indeed, fraud and abuse law can serve as an 
obstacle to the rationalization of the health care marketplace. 
See also David A. Hyman & Joel V. Williamson, Fraud and Abuse: Regulatory Alternatives 
in a “Competitive” Health Care Era, 19 LOY. U. CHI. L.J., 1133, 1135 (1988).   
Although the statute was an effective and logical response to fraud and abuse under a 
cost-based system, it may be inappropriate to apply the same rules to the newly 
competitive health care environment.  The statute is broadly worded and appears to 
prohibit many arrangements that pose little risk to the integrity of the [Medicare and 
Medicaid] program or the quality of medical care. 
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physician practice, the hospital may be in violation of the anti-kickback statute if it 
charges less than the fair market value for the services it provides to the MSO on the 
theory that such savings are “remuneration” to induce referrals.12   
At the forefront of the debate over the anti-kickback statute, and the topic of this 
Note, is the mens rea, or mental state, that is required for a violation of the law.  
According to the statute, an individual must “knowingly and willfully” solicit or 
receive, or offer or pay, remuneration in order to induce business reimbursed under 
any federal health care program.13  The interpretation of these terms by the federal 
courts has varied wildly, as have the underlying Supreme Court cases cited as 
precedent for such interpretations.  However, in June of 1998, the Supreme Court 
defined the meaning of “willfully” under a federal criminal statute in Bryan v. United 
States.14  Although the criminal statute in Bryan was unrelated to health care fraud, 
the Eleventh Circuit has adopted the Bryan Court’s definition of “willfully” in a case 
involving the anti-kickback statute.15  Whether Bryan will resolve the split between 
the circuit courts is unclear; however, this case is certain to significantly influence 
the debate. 
The following Section of this Note briefly summarizes the legislative 
development of the federal anti-kickback statute including the 1980 amendment 
adding the mens rea requirement.  Section II also summarizes the 1996 amendment 
requiring that the Secretary of the DHHS (Department of Health and Human 
Services) issue advisory opinions in response to requests for guidance about whether 
specific business arrangements are within the limits of the anti-kickback statute.  
Section III examines the various federal court interpretations of the mens rea 
requirement of the statute.  As described in this Section, there is a split of authority 
as to the meaning of the word “willfully” under the statute.  Because the Supreme 
Court has not interpreted the meaning of the mens rea requirement of the anti-
kickback statute, this Section also examines the principal cases that have defined 
“willfully” in the context of other federal criminal statutes, that have been relied 
upon in interpreting the anti-kickback statute.  Section IV analyzes Bryan v. United 
States, where the Supreme Court defined “willfully” under the Firearms Owners’ 
Protection Act, as acting with a “bad purpose” or with the intent to do something 
which the law forbids.16  Section V analyzes United States v. Starks, the first, and to 
date only, circuit court decision to interpret the mens rea standard of the statute in 
light of the Bryan decision.  Section VI analyzes the alternative interpretations of the 
mens rea standard of the anti-kickback statute, and the reasons that federal courts 
will likely adopt the Bryan court’s definition of “willfully.”  Finally, this Note 
concludes, that, despite its factual distinction from health care fraud and abuse 
                                                                
12Blumstein, supra note 9, at 217. 
13HIPAA § 204(a)(7).  “Federal health care program” is defined as “any plan or program 
that provides health benefits, whether directly, through insurance, or otherwise, which is 
funded directly, in whole or in part, by the United States Government,” or “any State health 
care program, as defined in section 1128(h).” HIPAA, Pub.L.No. 104-91, Section 204(a)(7), 
110 Stat. 1936, 2000 (1996). 
14Bryan, 524 U.S. at 184.  
15United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 1998).  
16Id. 
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litigation, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bryan will greatly impact the 
current debate about the proper interpretation of “willfully” under the anti-kickback 
statute. 
II.  LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE 
A.  Background 
The federal anti-kickback statute was first enacted as part of the Social Security 
Amendments of 1972,17 and was primarily concerned with outlawing health care 
referrals that were considered unethical or inappropriate.  Specifically, the statute 
made it a misdemeanor for any individual to furnish, solicit, offer or receive any 
kickback, bribe or rebate in connection with any item or service for which payment 
could be made under the Medicare and Medicaid programs.  A violation of the 
statute was punishable by a fine of up to $10,000, a maximum term of imprisonment 
of one year, or both.18 
Shortly after its enactment, several key issues arose regarding the statute’s 
interpretation.19  First, it did not appear that a mens rea, or mental culpability, was 
required for a violation of the statute.20  Second, it was unclear what types of 
business arrangements—particularly joint venture arrangements that were beginning 
to develop in the health care industry—were precluded by the statute.21  Finally, 
terms such as “kickback,” “bribe” and “rebate” were not defined in the statute.  
These uncertainties led to conflicting court interpretations of the statute.  
Consequently, government prosecutors were unsure what arrangements would be 
construed as a kickback and health care providers had little assurance that their 
commercial arrangements were properly structured.   
In response to these issues, Congress enacted the Medicare and Medicaid Anti-
Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977 (MMAAA).22  The amendments both 
expanded and narrowed the reach of the statute.  Congress expanded the reach of the 
statute by substituting the phrase “any remuneration” for the terms “rebates,” 
“bribes” and “kickbacks.”23  In addition, a violation of the statute was increased to 
felony status, and the penalties were raised to a maximum fine of up to $25,000 per 
violation and/or five years’ imprisonment.24  The legislative history of the MMAAA 
indicates that these amendments were intended to be read broadly in favor of the 
                                                                
17Social Security Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419-20 
(1972). 
18Id. 
19See TIMOTHY S. JOST & SHARON DAVIES, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE 
§§ 88-92 (1998) (providing a detailed discussion of conflicting judicial views of the 
interpretation of the 1972 anti-kickback statute). 
20Id. 
21Id. 
22Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
142, § 4(b)(1), 91 Stat. 1175, 1180 (1977). 
23Id. 
24Id. 
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government.25  On the other hand, concern that the provisions of the statute could be 
construed to punish innocent business transactions likely motivated the adoption of 
two exceptions to the statute.  First, the scope of the statute was narrowed to exclude 
the practice of discounts or other price reductions.26  Second, payments made to 
employees under a bona fide employment relationship were also excluded from the 
reach of the anti-kickback statute.27   
Instead of resolving the controversy over the interpretation and application of the 
anti-kickback statute, the 1977 amendments caused considerable worry among the 
health care industry due to their potential breadth.  Again, it was argued that a broad 
construction of the provisions of the statute (especially the undefined phrase “any 
remuneration”) would result in punishing not only those who had engaged in 
wrongful conduct, but also those providers whose conduct was innocent and socially 
beneficial.28 
B.  The “Willfully” Mens Rea Requirement 
In 1980, Congress amended the anti-kickback statute by adding a mens rea 
element.  Specifically, the amendment added the requirement that an individual must 
engage in the proscribed conduct “knowingly and willfully” to be convicted under 
the statute.29  The House Budget Committee Report pointed out that the purpose of 
the revision was to ensure that those whose conduct may have been improper would 
nonetheless not be prosecuted unless they specifically intended to engage in the 
proscribed conduct.30  This same mens rea element exists in the anti-kickback statute 
today. 
The mens rea requirement was added to quiet fears of unwarranted prosecution 
under the statute.  However, as discussed below, the interpretation and application of 
the requirement has been the source of considerable debate and controversy.   
The 1980 amendment adding the mens rea requirement was the last amendment 
to the prohibitive provisions of the anti-kickback statute.  Thus, the statute currently 
provides: 
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any 
remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or 
indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind– 
                                                                
25See JOST & DAVIES, supra note 17, at § 94. 
26Id. 
2742 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320a-7b(b)(3)(A) and (B) (1994). 
28See JOST & DAVIS, supra note 17, at §§ 94-95 (citing David M. Frankford, Creating and 
Dividing the Fruits of Collective Economic Activity: Referrals Among Health Care Providers, 
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1861, 1875-76 (December 1989). 
29See, Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 917, 94 Stat. 2599, 
2625 (1980).   
30Robert Salcido, Mixing Oil and Water: The Government’s Mistaken Use of the Medicare 
Anti-Kickback Statute in False Claims Act Prosecutions, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 105, 113 
(1997). 
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(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or 
arranging of any item or service for which payment may be made in 
whole or in part under a Federal health care program, . . . or 
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or 
recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, 
or item for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a 
Federal health care program, shall be guilty of a felony…31 
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration 
(including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or 
covertly, in cash or in kind to any person to induce such person– 
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for 
the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in 
whole or in part under [a Federal health care program], or 
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing, 
leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment 
may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program, 
shall be guilty of a felony…32 
C.  Further Amendments to the Statute 
The anti-kickback statute was further amended in 1987 to establish statutory 
exceptions to the law.  These exceptions included, among others, the so-called “safe 
harbors.”33  The safe harbor provisions were designed to assist health care providers 
in understanding the legal limits of the anti-kickback statute.34   
In 1996, as part of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 
Congress mandated that the Secretary of DHHS (Health and Human Services) (the 
“Secretary”) publish for comment and consider for final rulings any appropriate 
modifications to existing safe harbors, as well as promulgate additional safe harbor 
provisions.35  The Secretary must also issue advisory opinions explaining: the 
meaning of “remuneration”; whether a transaction is legal under the statute; what 
constitutes “an inducement to reduce or limit services” as prohibited by the statute, 
                                                                
31Social Security Act § 1128B(b)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320a-7b (b)(1)(A) and (B) (West 
Supp. 1997). 
32Social Security Act § 1128B(b)(2), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1320a-7b (b)(2)(A) and (B) (West 
Supp. 1997). 
33Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-
93, §§ 4, 14, 101 Stat. 680, 688-89, 697-98 (1987). 
34See generally, Aaron M. Altschuler, et al., Health Care Fraud, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
841 (1998); and Brian A. Kaser, Sailing Without Safe Harbors: Physician Recruitment and the 
Law of Fraud and Abuse, 9 (3) HEALTH SPAN 9 (1992). 
35HIPAA, § 205, 110 Stat. at 2000.   
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and whether an activity is subject to sanctions.36  Also under the HIPAA, the Office 
of the Inspector General (the “OIG”) must issue special fraud alerts in response to a 
request for guidance when the Secretary deems it to be appropriate.37  Finally, 
HIPAA required the Secretary to issue advisory opinions in response to requests for 
guidance about whether a specific business arrangement violates the anti-kickback 
law.38  The Secretary must issue an advisory opinion within 60 days of the receipt of 
a request, and the opinion is binding on both the Secretary and the party requesting 
the opinion.39  
These 1996 amendments were motivated by Congress’ belief that the Secretary’s 
clarification would enable prosecutors to spend their time on the more egregious 
types of conduct.  Congress also reasoned that while providers want to comply with 
the abuse statute, many are unsure of how the statute affects them and will, therefore, 
need to receive guidance from the government.40 
III.  JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE MENS REA REQUIREMENT OF THE ANTI-
KICKBACK STATUTE 
A.  Introduction 
As described above, the anti-kickback statute applies only to those acts that are 
performed “knowingly and willfully.”  Circuit courts have split (or arguably 
splintered) on the precise meaning of these words, and particularly the word 
“willfully,” in the context of the anti-kickback statute.  This Section begins with a 
brief review of the primary interpretations of the word “willfully” in the context of 
federal criminal statutes.  Following this review is an examination of the principal 
cases that have addressed the meaning of “knowingly and willfully” in the context of 
the anti-kickback statute, including the underlying cases cited in support these 
interpretations.  The most recent case to define “knowingly and willfully” in the 
context of the anti-kickback statute, United States v. Starks, which was decided after 
United States v. Bryan, is discussed in Section V. 
                                                                
36Id. at § 205, 110 Stat. at 2002. 
37Id. at § 205. 110 Stat. at 2003. 
38Id. at § 205, 110 Stat. at 2001-2002.  Under the direction of the Attorney General, the 
Secretary of DHHS (Health and Human Services) will issue advisory opinions about (1) what 
constitutes prohibited remuneration under the anti-kickback laws; (2) whether an arrangement 
falls within one of the statutory exceptions to the anti-kickback law; (3) whether an 
arrangement falls within an applicable safe harbor established by the OIG; (4) what constitutes 
an inducement to reduce or limit services; and (5) whether a particular activity constitutes 
grounds for penalties under the anti-kickback law, civil monetary law, or exclusion statutes.  
The OIG must accept requests for advisory opinions between February 21, 1997 and August 
21, 2000.   
39See, JOST & DAVIS, supra note 19, at §§ 3-13. 
40Id. 
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B.  The Meaning of “Willfully” in Federal Criminal Statutes 
The mens rea term “willfully” is often said to be “a word of many meanings,” 
whose construction varies based on the context in which it appears.41  Federal courts 
have generally interpreted “willfully” in one of three ways.  The first interpretation 
merely requires that the person act “knowingly” or “purposely,”42 which is to say 
that the actions are intentional rather than accidental.43  Under this interpretation, 
willful does not require an evil motive.44  The Model Penal Code adopts a similar 
interpretation of “willfulness” and provides that the mens rea is satisfied by the 
person acting “knowingly.”45   
The second interpretation of “willfully” generally requires a culpable state of 
mind,46 or proof that the act was committed with the specific intent to commit an 
unlawful act.47  Rather than merely committing the act “knowingly,” the actor must 
also know the conduct is wrongful.  Thus, courts frequently describe this mens rea 
standard as requiring proof of a “bad purpose.”48  This interpretation of “willfully” 
has been described by one circuit court as a “middle standard”49 and will be 
referenced as such throughout this Note. 
The third interpretation of “willfully” requires that the person violate a known 
legal duty.  This interpretation is considered to be a “heightened” mens rea standard 
because as it requires proof that the person knows the law that he or she is charged 
with violating.  In cases where this standard has been applied, courts have generally 
not required the defendant to know the specifics of the law, but he or she must be 
familiar with the law.50  Because this interpretation imposes such a heavy burden on 
the government, its application has generally been limited to cases where a person 
might become innocently engaged in conduct that is not inherently evil.51  As one 
                                                                
41Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191. 
42People v. Lee, 229 Cal. App. 3d 1504, 1508 (1981) (The word “willfully,” when used in 
a criminal statute, implies that a person knows what he is doing and intends to do what he is 
doing.); In re Jerry R, 29 Cal. App. 4th 438 (1987) (The term “willful” requires only that the 
prohibited act occur intentionally). 
43Commonwealth v. Cimino, 611 N.E.2d 738, 741 (Mass. 1993). 
44Commonwealth v. Luna, 641 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (Mass. 1994). 
45Model Penal Code § 2.02(8). 
46See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191.  (Defining “willfully” in the context of the federal anti-
structuring laws.  This case is discussed in detail in Section IV, herein). 
47United States v. Muthana, 60 F.3d 1217, 1222 (7th Cir. 1995). 
48United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933) (“[W]hen used in a criminal statute 
[willfully] generally means an act done with a bad purpose.”); Felton v. United State, 96 U.S. 
699, 702 (1877) (“Doing or omitting to do a thing knowingly and willfully, implies not only a 
knowledge of the thing, but a determination with a bad intent to do it or to omit doing it”). 
49United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 440 (8th Cir. 1996).  This case is discussed in detail 
in Section III herein.  
50Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991). 
51Id. at 200. 
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court described, the definition of “willfully” as “intentionally, deliberately, and 
knowingly” is appropriate for statutes criminalizing conduct that is inherently 
wrongful, or malum in se, whereas the heightened definition is appropriate for 
statutes criminalizing conduct that is not inherently nefarious, or malum 
prohibitum.52 
The common law maxim that “ignorance of the law is not a defense” generally 
applies to the first two interpretations of “willfully.”  Although courts have made 
exceptions to this general principle,53 persons are usually presumed to know the 
law.54  However, under the heightened mens rea standard, ignorance of the law 
becomes a defense because the accused must be shown to know the law.  If the 
person can demonstrate ignorance of the law, then that person cannot be convicted 
where the mens rea requires violation of a known legal duty.55 
The definition given to a mens rea element in criminal law, like the degree of 
scrutiny in constitutional law, will often determine the outcome of a case.  As 
described in the following Section, federal courts have split between the “middle 
standard” and the “heightened standard” in interpreting the meaning of the word 
“willfully” in the context of the anti-kickback statute.  The different definitions that 
have been adopted affect the criminal intent the government must prove, the defenses 
available to the defendant, and consequently, the outcome of the case.   
C.  The Heightened Mens Rea Standard 
1.  Hanlester Network v. Shalala 
In the much-publicized case of Hanlester Network v. Shalala,56 the Ninth Circuit 
held that “knowingly and willfully” under the anti-kickback statute required the 
government to prove that the defendant had (1) a knowledge of the law and (2) 
engaged in the “prohibited conduct with the specific intent to disobey the law.”57  
This requirement, that the defendant violate a known legal duty, can be referred to as 
a “heightened” mens rea standard, and is generally limited to instances where a 
defendant might innocently be ensnared in a complex legal arrangement.58 
The Hanlester Network was the general partner of three limited partnership 
laboratories in California.  Physicians in areas nearby the labs, who were in a 
                                                                
52State v. Azneer, 526 N.W.2d 298, 299 (Iowa 1995). 
53See State v. Guice, 621 A.2d 553 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1993) (holding that the 
general rule does not apply to cases where it would be counterproductive). 
54State v. Brumback, 671 N.E.2d 1064, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
55See Rachael Simonoff, Ratzlaf v. United States: The Meaning of “Willful” and the 
Demands of Due Process, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 397 (Spring 1995); Lindsey H. 
Simon, The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Word “Willful”:  Ignorance of the Law as 
an Excuse to Prosecutions for Structuring Currency Transactions, 85 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1161 (1995); and Michael L. Travers, Mistake of Law in Mala Prohibita 
Crimes, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1301 (1995). 
5651 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995). 
57Id. at 1400. 
58See Cheek, 498 U.S. 192 (1991); and Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994). 
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position to refer substantial quantities of tests to the labs, were sold limited 
partnership shares in the enterprise.  The Hanlester Network contracted with Smith 
Kline Beecham Clinical Laboraties, Inc. (SKBL) to operate the laboratories.  Under 
the terms of the agreement, 85 to 90 percent of the tests the physicians ordered were 
sent to SKBL laboratories.  OIG on behalf of DHHS alleged that Hanlester Network 
violated the anti-kickback statute by offering and paying remuneration to the 
physician-investors in exchange for referrals, and by soliciting and receiving 
remuneration from SKBL in exchange for referrals.59 
The Ninth Circuit unanimously disagreed with the government’s assertions, and 
affirmed the physician joint-venture arrangement.  The Court held that the 
“knowingly and willfully” anti-kickback standard requires the government to prove 
that litigants both (1) know that the statute “prohibits offering or paying 
remuneration to induce referrals, and (2) engage in prohibited conduct with the 
specific intent to disobey the law.”60  In applying this standard to the facts in 
Hanlester Network, the court noted that the partnership arrangement was a common 
joint venture arrangement and that the Network did not knowingly and willfully 
violate the law.  The court further reasoned that because dividends were paid to the 
limited partners based on the number of ownership shares rather than the number of 
lab referrals, and because they did not conceal their payments, they did not believe 
that their arrangement was unlawful.61 
In reaching its interpretation of “knowingly and willfully,” the Ninth Circuit 
relied primarily on the legislative history of the statute and the Supreme Court’s 
definition of “willfully” in Ratzlaf.62  The Ninth Circuit determined that Congress 
used the phrase “knowingly and willfully” to prevent prosecution of those whose 
conduct “while improper, was inadvertent.”63  As discussed above, there is evidence 
for this interpretation in that the mens rea element was added in the 1980 
amendments to the statute.  The Ratzlaf case relied on by the court is discussed 
below. 
Following the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the Department of Health and Human 
Services requested that the Solicitor General appeal the decision to the Supreme 
Court.  The Inspector General refused this request due to a lack of conflict among 
judicial circuits.64 
2.  Ratzlaf v. United States 
In Ratzlaf v. United States,65 the Supreme Court concluded that “willfully,” in the 
context of federal anti-structuring laws, requires knowledge of the law and the 
                                                                
59Hanlester, 51 F.3d at 1394-95. 
60Id. at 1400. 
61Id. at 1400-1401. 
62Id. at 1400. 
63Hanlester, 51 F.3d at 1399 n.16 (quoting H.R. 96-1167, 96th Cong. (1980)). 
64Department of Justice Refuses to Ask for Supreme Court Review of Hanlester Anti-
Kickback Case, 5 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 6 d14 (Feb. 8, 1996) (Cited in JOST & DAVIS, supra 
note 17, at § 3-13). 
65510 U.S. 135. 
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specific intent to violate the law.66  Ratzlaf relied on Cheek v. United States67 where 
the Supreme Court held that in cases involving complex statutory schemes (such as 
the federal tax code) knowledge of the law is required to avoid penalizing innocent 
behavior. 
In Ratzlaf, the defendant owed a casino $160,000 for a gambling debt that he 
incurred one evening at the blackjack table.  Aware that banks must report certain 
currency transactions over $10,000 to the Internal Revenue Service, Mr. Ratzlaf 
obtained multiple cashier’s checks in amounts slightly less than the limit, to pay for 
his losses.  Ratzlaf was charged however, with “structuring” his transactions to evade 
bank reporting requirements, which is a separate violation from the bank reporting 
law that he was aware.  The federal structuring law requires “willful” conduct, and 
Ratzlaf argued that his knowledge of the bank reporting laws was not sufficient to 
convict him of violating the structuring law.  The Supreme Court agreed with 
Ratzlaf, and held that the mens rea element of the statute required the government to 
prove that he actually knew of structuring law and acted in violation of the law.68 
The Hanlester Network/Ratzlaf approach turns the American legal maxim 
“ignorance of the law is no excuse” on its head, and permits a person who is ignorant 
of the anti-kickback law to avoid conviction under it.  Furthermore, under 
Hanlester/Ratzlaf, a defendant must not only know of the statute, but must also be 
shown to intend to violate the law, in order to be convicted.  Because it sets a very 
high burden for conviction under the anti-kickback statute, the Hanlester Network 
decision has been applauded and criticized by health law scholars.69 
3.  The Aftermath of Hanlester–The Caremark Decision 
The heightened mens rea standard adopted in Hanlester was applied by a 
Minnesota district court in United States v. Caremark.70  In Caremark, three home 
health care executives were accused of paying kickbacks to a physician in exchange 
for prescribing a Caremark growth hormone.  The district court granted defendants’ 
motion for acquittal because the government had not met the Hanlester standard of 
proof that defendants knew their conduct violated the anti-kickback law.71 
                                                                
66Id. at 149. 
67498 U.S. 192 (1991). 
68Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 136-140. 
69See Tamsen Douglas Love, Toward a Fair and Practical Definition of “Willfully” in the 
Medicare/Medicaid Anti Kickback Statute, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1029 (May 1997); and Brian J. 
Hennigan & Arif Alikhan, Willfulness Under the Medicare Anti-Kickback Statutes:  The 
Continuing Debate Over Whether Ignorance of the Law is a Defense in Medicare 
Prosecutions, A.B.A. CENTER FOR CONT. LEGAL ED. NAT’L INST. (Criminal Justice Section, 
March 6-7, 1997) (critiquing Hanlester Network); and William R. Kucera, Jr., Hanlester 
Network v. Shalala:  A Model Approach to the Medicare and Medicaid Kickback Problem, 91 
NW. U. L. REV. 413 (1996); and Andrea Tuwiner Vavonese, The Medicare Anti-Kickback 
Provision of the Social Security Act—Is Ignorance of the Law an Excuse for Fraudulent and 
Abusive Use of the System?, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 943 (1996) (in defense of Hanlester). 
70See JOST & DAVIES, supra note 19, at § 3-13 (discussing Caremark which is 
unpublished). 
71Id.  
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The Caremark case illustrates the rigorous burden Hanlester places on the 
government to win a conviction under the anti-kickback statute.  Other circuit courts 
however, have rejected the heightened mens rea standard, opting instead for a lesser 
standard of culpability. 
D.  The “Middle” Mens Rea Standard 
When the government was defeated in the Ninth Circuit in Hanlester Network, its 
strategy was to aggressively contest its application in other circuit courts rather than 
appealing to the Supreme Court.72  This strategy proved to be a success as the 
heightened mens rea standard of Hanlester was rejected at the appellate level in 
every circuit outside of the Ninth Circuit.  This section examines three of the 
principal cases that focused on the mens rea standard of the anti-kickback statute.  As 
described below, the courts in each of these cases adopted a “middle” mens rea 
standard that required less culpability than the heightened standard of 
Hanlester/Ratzlaf. 
1.  United States v. Jain 
The Eighth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to address the mens rea 
requirement of the anti-kickback statute in the wake of Hanlester.  The Eighth 
Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit’s requirement that the defendant know the law, and 
instead held that “willfully” means the defendant knew his conduct was wrongful.   
In United States v. Jain,73 Dr. Jain, a psychologist who operated an outpatient 
therapy clinic, was charged with receiving payments from a psychiatric hospital in 
return for patient referrals to the hospital.74  Dr. Jain testified that the payments he 
received were for mental health workshops he provided and that it would be 
“stupid,” “illegal,” “unethical” and “wrong” to ever request money for referrals.75  
Two former hospital administrators testified against Dr. Jain, and a jury found him 
guilty of violating the anti-kickback statute.76   
Both the government and Dr. Jain cited Cheek in support of the mens rea 
standard for “willfully”.  The government argued that the general rule is that 
“willfully” in a criminal statute “refers to consciousness of the act but not the 
consciousness that the act is unlawful.”77  Dr. Jain argued that the Cheek (and 
Ratzlaf) exceptions to the general rule–that a defendant must violate a “known legal 
duty”–was the proper interpretation of “willfully.”78  The Eighth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s definition that “the word ‘willfully’ means unjustifiably and 
wrongfully, known to be such by the defendant…”79  The appellate court found the 
                                                                
72See William R. Kucera, Jr., supra note 64 at 446. 
7393 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 1996). 
74Id.  
75Id. at 438-39. 
76Id. 
77Id. at 440, (citing Cheek, 498 U.S. at 209). 
78Id. (citing Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201 and Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 148). 
79Id. at 440. 
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anti-kickback statute shared the complexity of the anti-structuring laws in Ratzlaf, as 
both potentially criminalize conduct that is not “inevitably nefarious.”80  However, 
the Court distinguished the Ratzlaf interpretation of willfully because the anti-
structuring statute at issue in that case referred to a willful violation of another 
statute, and the court reasoned that one cannot willfully violate a statute without 
knowing the conduct proscribed by the statute.  In contrast, in the anti-kickback 
statute, the word “willfully” specifically modifies the receipt or payment of 
remuneration.  For this reason, the Court concluded that the proper mens rea standard 
is proof that the defendant “knew his conduct was wrongful, rather than proof that he 
knew it violated ‘a known legal duty.’”81 
In adopting a “middle ground”, the Jain court rejected the Hanlester 
Network/Ratzlaf mens rea construction.  According to Jain, the government is not 
required to prove the defendant knew the law or had the specific intent to violate the 
law; rather, it is sufficient to prove that defendant knew the conduct was wrongful.  
This standard maintains that ignorance of the law is not a defense, but that “good 
faith” conduct is.82 
2.  United States v. Davis 
In United States v. Davis,83 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s jury 
instructions that “willfully” means to disobey the law or to act with the specific 
intent to do something the law forbids.84  In reaching the decision, the Fifth Circuit 
adopted a middle position similar to the standard set for forth by the Eighth Circuit in 
Jain. 
In Davis, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to offer and pay 
inducements for Medicare patient referrals in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and for 
offering and paying such inducements in violation of the anti-kickback statute.85  
Davis appealed his conviction on two grounds.  First, he argued that the district court 
erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could convict him only if it found that his 
payments to a physician were “for no other purpose” than “inducing the referral of 
Medicare patients.”86  The appellate court held that this decision or holding was an 
erroneous statement of the law and was properly rejected.  The court found that it 
was only necessary that the payments be in part an inducement to violate the law. 87 
Second, Davis claimed that the district court failed to properly instruct the jury 
regarding the mens rea terms “knowingly” and “willfully” and that the jury should 
have received his requested instruction concerning good faith.88  The appeals court 
                                                                
80Jain, 93 F.3d at 440. 
81Id. at 441. 
82Id. at 440. 
83132 F.3d 1092 (5th Cir. 1998). 
84Id. at 1094. 
85Id. 
86Id. at 1094. 
87Id. (citing Polk County, Tex. v. Peters, 800 F. Supp. 1451, 1456 (E.D. Tex. 1992). 
88Id. at 1094. 
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rejected this argument because it found that the district court’s definitions of 
“knowingly” and “willfully” adequately explained the concept of good faith.89  
Citing Hanlester Network, Davis argued, however, that the anti-kickback statute 
contained a “heightened scienter requirement” and that the district court’s definitions 
were therefore inadequate.90  The district court had instructed the jury that 
“knowingly” means that the act was committed “voluntarily and intentionally, not 
because of mistake or accident,” and that “willfully” means that the act was done 
“voluntarily and purposely with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; 
that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.”91  The Fifth 
Circuit approved of these definitions, but stated that it was not deciding whether the 
anti-kickback statute included a heightened mens rea standard.92  
In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit incorrectly read Hanlester as requiring 
only that the defendant knows that the conduct in question is unlawful.93  As noted 
above, the heightened mens rea standard of Hanlester requires knowledge of the law 
as well as the specific intent to violate the law.  Therefore, while the Davis court did 
not explicitly decide whether the anti-kickback statute included a heightened mens 
rea standard, it implicitly rejected its requirement that the defendant know the law 
that he or she is charged with violating.  In so doing, the Fifth Circuit adopted a 
standard similar to the Eighth Circuit’s “middle standard” in Jain. 
3.  United States v. Neufeld 
In United States v. Neufeld,94 a federal district court refused to adopt the Ratzlaf 
and Hanslester definitions of “willful” which required that a defendant know that his 
conduct was illegal.  Rather, the court interpreted “willful” as the purpose to commit 
a wrongful act.95 
In this case, Dr. Neufeld, who had been licensed to practice medicine in the State 
of Ohio since 1975, contracted with a home infusion company to act as a consultant 
to the company in its development of treatment and educational programs for its staff 
and patients.96  Dr. Neufeld was paid by the company for services performed under 
the consulting agreements.97  Based on these payments, Dr. Neufeld was indicted for 
conspiracy to violate and the violation of the anti-kickback statute.98 
Interpreting the anti-kickback statute, the court declined to provide an exact 
definition of the scienter requirement.  However, it rejected the Ratzlaf definition of 
                                                                
89Id. (citing United States v. Upton, 91 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
90Id. 
91Id. (citing United States v. Garcia, 762 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1985) (approving 
substantially the same definition of “willfully”)). 
92Id. at 1094.  
93Davis, 132 F. 3d at 1094. 
94908 F. Supp. 491 (S.D. Ohio 1995). 
95Id. at 497. 
96Id. 
97Id. 
98Id. at 493. 
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“willful” and adopted a formulation of the term which takes into account the purpose 
to commit a wrongful act.99  The court reasoned that, unlike the structuring in 
Ratzlaf, taking bribes for referrals is an inherently wrongful activity of which a 
physician should be aware.  Thus, the scienter requirement in the anti-kickback 
statute is satisfied by mere purposeful conduct, negating the need for the heightened 
scienter requirement adopted in Ratzlaf.100 
E.  Summary of the Judicial Constructions of the “Willfully” Mens Rea Requirement 
The government’s defeat in Hanlester proved to be short-lived, as other federal 
courts refused to adopt the heightened mens rea standard, choosing instead to 
interpret “willfully” as something short of violating a known legal duty.  The Eighth 
Circuit Court in Jain, ruled that since the anti-kickback statute prohibited what 
would otherwise be innocent conduct, it required a more rigorous mens rea standard 
than a mere consciousness of the act.  However, the court distinguished the anti-
kickback statute from the anti-structuring statute in Ratzlaf, and refused the appeal 
on the grounds that the defendant must know the law in order to be convicted of 
violating the statute.101  The Eighth Circuit approved of the district court’s “middle 
ground” interpretation that “willfully” means “unjustifiably and wrongfully, known 
to be such by the defendant.”102 
In Davis, the Fifth Circuit court adopted a scienter requirement that could 
likewise be considered a “middle” standard as it required more than mere awareness 
of the act, but less than knowledge of the law.  The court affirmed the district court 
definition that “willfully” is an act “committed voluntarily and purposely with the 
specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either 
to disobey or disregard the law.”103  At first glance, this definition appears to be 
consistent with the heightened mens rea standard, however it is possible for a person 
to intentionally do something which the law forbids, without actually knowing the 
law.  Therefore, while Davis may arguably require a greater level of culpability than 
Jain (although it is doubtful that a juror would perceive such subtle differences), it 
still falls within the same “middle” standard mens rea.   
Similarly, in Neufeld, the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio adopted a “middle” standard that “takes into account the purpose to commit a 
wrongful act.”104  The court declined to follow Hanlester/Ratzlaf for two reasons.  
                                                                
99Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491, 497. 
100Id. at 496. 
101Id.  As noted above, the Eighth Circuit distinguished the anti-kickback statute from the 
anti-structuring statute on the basis that the mens rea requirement in the anti-kickback statute 
referenced a separate provision of the law.  As the Jain court noted: “The statute at issue in 
Ratzlaf made criminal a willful violation of another anti-structuring statute.  Because one 
cannot willfully violate a statute without knowing what the statute prohibits, the Supreme 
Court required proof that defendant intentionally violated a ‘known legal duty.’ 510 U.S. at 
140-141.  By contrast, in the Medicare anti-kickback statute, the word “willfully” modifies a 
series of prohibited acts.”  Jain, 93 F.3d at 441.  
102Jain, 93 F.3d at 440. 
103Davis, 132 F.3d at 1094. 
104Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. at 497. 
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First, the court claimed that unlike the anti-structuring statute, the anti-kickback 
statute did not have parallel criminal and penalty provisions which required that a 
person know the law that related to the penalty provision.105 Second, the court found 
that Doctor Neufeld’s taking bribes for referrals was not the type of innocent 
behavior that the heightened standard was intended to protect against.  The Neufeld 
court declined to provide an exact definition of “willfully,” but relied on Jain for its 
“wrongful act” formulation.106 
Jain, Davis, and Neufeld suggest that the “middle standard” represents the 
majority view of the scienter requirement of the anti-kickback statute.  However, 
because the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue, the “heightened standard” 
established in Hanlester is still good law.  Furthermore, the Ratzlaf case, which was 
the basis for Hanlester, suggests that the Supreme Court has broadened the scope of 
the heightened mens rea standard beyond its narrow holding in Cheek, and may be 
the appropriate interpretation of “willfully” under the anti-kickback statute.  The 
following Section analyzes the Supreme Court’s most recent definition of “willfully” 
in the context of a federal criminal statute.  Whether this definition, which is a 
“middle standard,” or the Hanlester/Ratzlaf “heightened standard,” is most likely to 
be adopted by courts interpreting the anti-kickback statute is discussed in Section VII 
below. 
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT’S MOST RECENT INTERPRETATION OF “WILLFUL”  
A.  Bryan v. United States 
The Supreme Court has not addressed the meaning of “knowingly and willfully” 
in the context of the anti-kickback statute.  Therefore, the split in the circuit courts 
continues.  However, the High Court’s recent decision in Bryan v. United States,107 
involving a federal firearms trafficing law, is certain to impact this debate.  At issue 
in Bryan was whether the Court would maintain the heightened mens rea 
requirement established in Cheek/Ratzlaf, or whether a lesser mens rea standard 
would support a conviction.  The Court chose the latter, holding “willfully” is the 
intent to do something the law forbids without knowledge of the specific law.108 
In Bryan, the defendant was convicted of violating the Firearms Owners’ 
Protection Act (FOPA), which prohibits anyone from “willfully” violating, inter alia, 
Section 922(a)(1)(A), which forbids dealing in firearms without a federal license.  
The trial court evidence, which was accepted by the Supreme Court, showed that: the 
defendant did not have a license to deal in firearms; he used “straw purchasers” in 
Ohio to acquire hand guns; and he resold the guns on Brooklyn street corners known 
for drug dealing.109  According to the Court, the evidence proved the defendant was 
                                                                
105This was the same argument that the Eighth Circuit court raised in Jain.  See discussion 
infra. 
106Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491 at 497. 
107524 U.S. 184 (1998). 
108Bryan, 524 U.S. 190. 
109Id. 
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dealing in firearms and that he knew that his conduct was illegal, but there was no 
evidence that he was specifically aware of the federal licensing requirement.110   
At trial, the defendant requested the jury be instructed that he could only be 
convicted if he had actual knowledge of the federal firearms law.111  The trial judge 
refused the requested jury instructions and explained that the term “willfully” 
required intent to do something unlawful, but that it did not require a specific 
knowledge of the law or rule alleged to have been violated.112   
On appeal, the defendant raised two primary arguments in support of a 
heightened mens rea requirement.  First, he argued that since the statute included 
three categories of acts that required “knowing” conduct, Congress must have 
intended a higher standard for “willful” conduct.113  The Court found that 
“knowledge” meant merely a knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense and 
not knowledge of the law.114  More is required with respect to “willful” conduct, 
which the Court held required a finding that the defendant “acted with an evil-
meaning mind, that is to say, that he acted with knowledge that his conduct was 
unlawful.”115 
Second, the defendant argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Cheek and 
Ratzlaf defined the statutory construction of “willful” as requiring specific awareness 
of the law under which the defendant was charged.  However, the Court 
distinguished these cases as exceptions to the general rule that “ignorance of the law 
is no excuse” because they were highly technical and presented the danger of 
ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct.116  According to the 
Court, this danger was not present in Bryan, as the defendant knew his conduct was 
unlawful and because the FOPA statute itself was designed to protect law-abiding 
citizens who inadvertently violate the law.117 
In a rather strange conclusion to these primary challenges by the defendant, the 
Court stated, “[t]hus, the willfulness requirement of § 924(a)(1)(D) does not carve 
                                                                
110Id. at 196. 
111Id. at 1944 n.10. (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994), the defendant 
requested that the jury instructions state that “[Y]ou must be persuaded that with the actual 
knowledge of the federal firearms licensing laws Defendant acted in knowing and intentional 
violation of them.”). 
112118 S. Ct. at 1944, FN 11, citing App. 18-19.  Specifically, the trial judge stated: “A 
person acts willfully if he acts intentionally and purposely and with the intent to do something 
the law forbids, that is, with the bad purpose to disobey or to disregard the law.  Now, the 
person need not be aware of the specific law or rule that his conduct may be violating.  But he 
must act with the intent to do something that the law forbids.”  
113Although the defendant did not raise this issue, it should be noted that the scienter 
requirements of “knowing” and “willful” were added after the fact.  This is analogous to the 
anti-kickback statute which also added the scienter requirement several years after the original 
act was passed. 
114Bryan, 524 U.S. at 193. 
115Id. 
116Id., citing Ratzlaf at 144-45. 
117Id., see FN 23 citing United States v. Andrade, 135 F.3d 104, 108-109 (C.A.1 1998). 
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out an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse; 
knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is all that is required.”118  While it may seem 
contradictory for the Court to state in the same sentence that ignorance is no excuse, 
but that knowledge is required, it appears that what the Court is saying that the 
defendant does not need to know the specifics of the law in order to be convicted.  In 
other words, it is sufficient that the defendant know that his conduct is unlawful in a 
general sense.   
In addition to the two primary challenges, the defendant also raised arguments 
based on the legislative history of FOPA.  The defendant argued that when the 
scienter requirement was added to the legislation, at least some legislators 
understood the term willfully as requiring that a defendant would have to know the 
details of the law in order to be convicted under it.  The Court rejected this argument 
as the legislators cited by the defendant were in opposition to amending the 
legislation, and the opposition is not an authoritative guide to the construction of the 
legislation.119   
Finally, the defendant argued that, at the time FOPA was passed, the lower courts 
uniformly interpreted “willfulness” in other sections of the statute as a knowledge of 
the law.120  The Court rejected any such uniformity among the lower courts and noted 
that in each of the cases where knowledge of the law was required, it had been 
established that the defendants had had a knowledge of the law when committing the 
crime.121 
In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Ginsberg, 
argued that the statute is ambiguous, and the presumption should be that Congress 
intended a willful violation of the law to require specific knowledge of the offense.122  
Scalia pointed out that the government concedes that the defendant must know that 
the conduct violates the law, as the jury instructions stated that defendant “acted with 
knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.”123  However, Scalia criticized the 
majority for allowing any unlawful act–even one that is unrelated to the licensing 
law–to stand in the place of a violation of the anti-trafficing law.  For example, he 
noted Mr. Bryan would be guilty of violating the anti-trafficing law based on filing 
off serial numbers or using straw purchasers, even if he had never heard of the 
licensing requirement.  Scalia argued that the majority would convict if the defendant 
“…knew that the car out of which he sold the guns was illegally double-parked, or if, 
in order to meet the appointed time for sale, he intentionally violated Pennsylvania’s 
speed limit on the drive back from the gun purchase in Ohio.”124  Finally, Justice 
Scalia argued that there is precedence for the heightened mens rea requirement based 
on the Cheek and Ratzlaf decisions.125  He disputed the majority’s explanation, 
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however, that the higher standard applies in those cases because of the complexity of 
the tax and currency laws.126  Rather, he bases the mens rea standard on the 
presumption that Congress intended the word “willfully” to mean a knowledge of the 
law violated.   
B.  The Potential Impact of Bryan 
Bryan defines willfully as requiring both an evil-meaning mind, and knowledge 
that the conduct is unlawful.127  The first element is satisfied by the purposeful 
conduct of the defendant.  The second element can be satisfied by an unlawful act, 
even if the act is remotely related to the statute.  As noted by the dissent, there does 
not appear to be a nexus requirement between the unlawful act and the statute under 
which the defendant is charged.  This is evidenced by the Court’s approval of the 
trial judges statement that “the government is not required to prove that the 
defendant knew that a license was required, nor is the government required to prove 
that he had knowledge that he was breaking the law.”128  Based on the evidence in 
Bryan–straw purchases, filed-down serial numbers, and pistol sales on notoriously 
high-crime street corners–there was a relationship to the federal licensing 
requirement.  Therefore, the rule from Bryan appears to be that a defendant can be 
convicted for willfully violating a criminal statute where the defendant knowingly 
and with an evil mind engages in unlawful conduct that is related to, or suggests a 
knowledge of, the proscribed acts of the statute.   
The Court’s definition of “willfully” in Bryan will impact the mens rea 
requirements under the anti-kickback statute because it is on point with the statute.  
Both statutes were amended to include a mens rea requirement of “willfully” and 
both include separate definitions of “knowingly” and “willfully.”  Because of these 
similarities, and for the reasons discussed in Section VI below, the Bryan decision 
will likely be followed in cases such as Starks.  However, because the defendant’s 
conduct in Bryan was done with an evil purpose and the defendant knew he was 
violating a law, the case does not address situations where a defendant was mistaken 
about the unlawfulness of the conduct.  For example, in Hanlester, if defendants had 
argued that they were aware of the anti-kickback statute, but misunderstood its 
application, they would have failed to satisfy the requirement of knowing the 
conduct is unlawful.  Because of the unlawful conduct in Bryan, the Court does not 
address this issue. 
V.  THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT RESPONSE TO BRYAN–UNITED STATES V. STARKS 
Just four months after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bryan, the Eleventh Circuit 
court was confronted with the issue of interpreting the meaning of “willfully” in 
United States v. Starks,129 a case involving the anti-kickback statute.  The Eleventh 
Circuit was to decide whether the anti-kickback statute required the 
Hanlester/Ratzlaf “heightened” mens rea standard, or whether the Bryan/Jain 
                                                                
126Id. 
127Id. 
128Id. at 200.  The Court noted that the last sentence was incorrect without the words, “that 
required a license,” but found that this error was not a basis for reversal.  
129157 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 1998). 
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“middle” standard applied.  In a decision that is certain to be closely scrutinized by 
those interested in the debate over the scienter requirement of the anti-kickback 
statute, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a “middle” culpability standard by defining 
“willfully” as “the specific intent to do something that the law forbids.”130 
Starks involved a kickback arrangement whereby two Florida state community 
health aides were paid for referring pregnant women to Future Steps, Inc., a private 
drug addiction treatment clinic.131  Future Steps was operating under a contract with 
Florida CHS’s Metropolitan General Hospital.132  The contract contained a provision 
explicitly forbidding Future Steps from making any payment for patient referrals in 
violation of the anti-kickback statute.133  Shortly after entering into the agreement, 
Future Steps was having difficulty attracting patients.  When efforts to build referral 
relationships failed, the president of Future Steps offered to pay the defendant 
community health aides $250 for each patient they referred for inpatient treatment.  
Under the referral arrangement, the health aides were paid in cash or check, usually 
at a parking lot or restaurant.134   
The defendants were convicted of violating the anti-kickback statute.  At trial, the 
district court instructed the jury that the word “willfully” means the specific intent to 
act unlawfully, with a bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law.135  On appeal, 
defendants claimed that the jury instructions failed to require knowledge that their 
referral arrangement violated the anti-kickback statute.  Relying principally on 
Ratzlaf, and the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Sanchez-Corcino,136 defendants argued 
that a heightened mens rea standard applied in cases where the statute required a 
“willful” violation of the law. 
Based on Bryan, the Eleventh Circuit rejected Ratzlaf and its own prior holding 
in Sanchez-Corcino in denying the petitioner’s appeal.  The court distinguished 
Ratzlaf on the basis that the anti-kickback statute “is not a highly technical tax or 
financial regulation that poses the danger of ensnaring persons engaged in apparently 
innocent activity,”137 and Sanchez-Corcino was specifically overruled in Bryan.138  
The trial court’s definition of “willfully” in Starks was almost identical to the 
                                                                




134Sparks, 157 F.3d at 836. 
135Id. at 837-838.  The district court’s complete jury instructions were as follows:  “The 
word willfully, as that term is used from time to time in these instructions, means the act was 
committed voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, 
that is with a bad purpose, either to disobey or disregard the law.”  
13685 F.3d 549 (11th Cir. 1996).  In Sanchez-Corcino, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the 
word “willfully” in 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(D) (requiring a license to possess firearms), to mean 
that the person “acted with knowledge of the licensing requirement.”  Id. at 553-54.  
(“[k]nowledge of the general illegality of one’s conduct is not the same as knowledge that one 
is violating a specific rule.”). 
137Starks, 157 F.3d at 838. 
138Bryan, 524 U.S. at 192. 
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definition that the Supreme Court approved in Bryan.  This definition is consistent 
with the “middle” standard definitions adopted by the Fifth and Eighth Circuit 
courts. 
Proponents of Hanlester will take issue with the Starks decision for several 
reasons.  First, the court quickly dismissed the anti-kickback statute as not being 
highly technical like the tax (Cheek) and financial regulation (Ratzlaf) statutes that 
call for the heightened standard.  According to the Eleventh Circuit, “the giving or 
taking of kickbacks for medical referrals is hardly the sort of activity a person might 
expect to be legal.”139  The court’s reasoning that kickbacks are malum in se, rather 
than malum prohibitum, oversimplifies the complexity of modern health care 
remuneration arrangements, and underestimates the potential for becoming 
innocently engaged in prohibited transactions.  Furthermore, the Starks court appears 
to base its conclusion about the complexity of the anti-kickback statute on the facts 
of the case at hand.  For example, the court pointed out the referral arrangements 
directly affected the counseling of the pregnant women who relied on the counselors 
for help,140 and the defendant health aides threatened to take away indigent womens’ 
babies if they did not receive treatment from Future Steps.141  While these acts are 
malum in se, they should not be read into the court’s interpretation of the scienter 
requirements of the statute.  The meaning of “willfully” under the law should stand 
independent of the facts of the case.   
In addition to the fact that the Starks defendants knew that they were acting 
unlawfully, the defendant, Future Steps, was also aware of the anti-kickback law 
through its contract with the hospital.142  Because Future Steps engaged in the 
unlawful activity that was expressly prohibited in the contract, it is questionable 
whether they would have escaped conviction even under the heightened mens rea 
standard.  Such unsympathetic defendants are hardly the type that make a good case 
for a more rigorous scienter standard. 
The Starks/Bryan mens rea standard is similar to the “middle” culpability 
standard in Jain, Davis, and Neufeld.  This standard represents the majority view of 
the meaning of “willfully” under the anti-kickback statute, but does not overrule the 
“heightened” standard established in Hanlester/Ratzlaf.  Because both Supreme 
Court cases were interpreting the meaning of the “willful” under different criminal 
statutes, and because the Court has never interpreted the mens rea requirement of the 
anti-kickback statute, courts are able to adopt whichever standard they choose.  
However, for the reasons discussed below, the Bryan “middle” standard is most 
likely to be followed in cases involving the mens rea of the anti-kickback statute.  
                                                                
139Starks, 157 F.3d at 838. 
140Id. 
141Id. at 837. 
142Id. at 839 n.8.  In evaluating the district court decision, the Court stated that, “[t]he 
government produced ample evidence, including furtive methods by which [Future Steps] 
remunerated Starks and Henry, from which the jury could reasonably have inferred that that 
[defendants] knew that they were breaking the law—even if they may not have known that 
they were specifically violating the Anti-Kickback statute. 
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VI.  ANALYSIS OF THE ANTI-KICKBACK MENS REA STANDARDS 
A.  Understanding the Alternative Standards 
As the Supreme Court noted in Bryan, the mens rea term “willful” is “a word of 
many meanings.”143  As described in Section III, these meanings generally fall into 
one of three definitions:  a lesser degree of culpability that merely requires the 
person to act “knowingly,” a middle standard that requires intent to violate the law or 
the showing of an “evil purpose,” and a heightened standard of culpability that 
requires knowledge of the law coupled with the intent to violate the law.  In 
interpreting “willfully” in the context of the anti-kickback statute, federal courts have 
generally adopted either the middle standard or the heightened mens rea standard.  
No federal court appears to have adopted the lesser degree of culpability.  This is 
likely because the anti-kickback statute contains the phrase “knowingly and 
willfully,” and were a court to give the same meaning to both terms, “willfully” 
would be mere surplusage.144   
While the definitions for the middle standard and heightened standard often 
appear to be very similar, they are very different in application.  The following 
hypothetical will help to illustrate the differences between these definitions.  
Suppose a representative from a pharmaceutical company approaches a physician 
and invites her to participate in a research project for a new allergy medication.  
Under terms of the agreement, the physician agrees to record a series of utilization 
outcomes of her patients using (and purchasing) the medication and to share the 
results with the pharmaceutical company.  In exchange for the doctor’s time and 
efforts in recording the patient data and agreeing to the share the results, the 
physician will receive a research stipend. 
Under the first interpretation of “willfully,” the physician would be liable for 
violating the anti-kickback statute merely because she knew that she was receiving 
remuneration in return for medication that she ordered for her patients.145  Despite 
the fact that the physician was unaware of the anti-kickback law or that such a 
stipend would be considered remuneration, she will still be liable for knowingly 
accepting the payment.  The common law principle that ignorance of the law is not a 
defense will impose upon her the presumption that she knows the law.146  Therefore, 
since she knowingly accepted the stipend money under this scenario, she will be 
liable for violation of the anti-kickback statute under the first interpretation of 
willfully.147   
                                                                
143Bryan, 524 U.S. at 188. 
144This argument was raised in Ratzlaf v. United States, where the majority criticized the 
trial judge and the Ninth Circuit for approving of a definition of “willfully” that was 
essentially the same as the definition for “knowingly.”  See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. 135, 140. 
145Numerous courts have interpreted the language “in return for” very broadly.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 
71 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988 (1985). 
146See Brumback, 671 N.E. 2d 1064. 
147This situation is distinguished from strict liability, where the physician would be liable 
without the government proving that she knew of the remuneration.  Under strict liability, the 
physician would be liable under a situation where the payments were being received for the 
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Under the second interpretation, the government must prove that the physician 
had the intent to violate the law or entered into the agreement with an evil motive.  
The intent to violate the law is a question of fact that will be decided upon the 
evidence presented at trial.  Under the present hypothetical, it is unclear whether the 
physician entered into the agreement innocently, or whether there was intent to 
violate the law or an evil motive.  If the physician could prove she did not consider 
the stipend to be remuneration, then she would not be liable under the anti-kickback 
law.  For example, if she could demonstrate that she did not increase the volume of 
prescriptions of the medication under the study, or that she honestly believed that her 
work was contributing to legitimate research in her field, she would not likely be 
convicted under the anti-kickback statute.  However, if the government could prove 
that the physician knew that the stipend was really an inducement to increase 
utilization of the medication, or that she attempted to conceal the payment because it 
might be wrongful, then she would likely be guilty of violating the anti-kickback 
statute under the second interpretation of the mens rea requirement.   
Under the third interpretation of “willfully,” the physician would be liable only if 
the government could meet the heightened standard of proving that she violated a 
known legal duty.  This is a difficult requirement to meet, as it requires proof that the 
physician knew the anti-kickback law.  In cases where this standard has been 
adopted, the courts have generally stated that the accused need not know the 
specifics of the law, but must be shown to at least know of the law.148  Under this 
standard, the government might win a conviction if, for example, she knew of the 
anti-kickback law through training from her practice group or if she were practicing 
under a managed care contract that specifically forbid such agreements.  Short of 
some showing of actual knowledge of the anti-kickback statute, it will be difficult for 
the physician in this example to be found liable for violating the law under the third 
interpretation of “willfully.” 
B.  Why Federal Courts Will Likely Follow Bryan in Anti-Kickback Cases 
The Supreme Court’s recent interpretation of “willfully” in Bryan will likely be 
adopted by federal courts interpreting the scienter requirement of the anti-kickback 
statute.  Even before the Court had reached its final outcome in that case, it was 
anticipated to have a “dramatic” impact on future anti-kickback litigation.149  Based 
on the Eleventh Circuit’s adoption of Bryan in United States v. Starks, this prediction 
is already coming true.  There are several reasons why the Bryan decision is likely to 
be followed in the context of the anti-kickback statute.  
First, Bryan is consistent with the general interpretation of “willfully.”  While the 
word “willfully” has many different meanings, it is most commonly defined as a 
“bad purpose” or “intending to violate the law.”150  This definition is consistent with 
                                                          
physician by the office manager without the physician being aware that she was being 
compensated for recording the patient outcomes. 
148Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200. 
149See Sharon L. Davies, Guidance on Meaning of “Willfulness” Looming?  How Bryan 
Might Affect the Hanlester Debate, 10 HEALTH LAW 14 (1998).  
150United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (“[W]hen used in a criminal statute 
[willfully] generally means an act done with a bad purpose . . .”). 
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the common law understanding of the word151 and modern statutory construction.152  
The Bryan decision is also consistent with the majority view of the interpretation of 
willfully under the anti-kickback statute.  The Eighth Circuit court in Jain, the Fifth 
Circuit court in Davis, and the Eleventh Circuit court in Starks have all adopted this 
standard.  This standard requires proof that the person knew his conduct was 
wrongful and chose to act contrary to the law.  Furthermore, Bryan is also consistent 
with the general principle that ignorance of the law is not a defense.  
Second, the heightened mens rea standard is intended to be limited to instances 
where a person might become innocently ensnared in a technical area of the law.  
Circuit Courts have split as to whether the anti-kickback statute qualifies as a highly 
technical area of the law.  In Hanlester, the Ninth Circuit court considered the anti-
kickback statute to be highly technical.  However, the Eleventh Circuit court 
disagreed, claiming that the statute was not highly technical.  Interestingly, the facts 
in each of these cases may have influenced the court’s reading of the statute.  
Hanlester involved a complicated kickback arrangement, whereas Starks involved a 
strait-forward kickback scenario.  However, courts should not selectively change the  
mens rea standard based on the facts of the case.   
Even if the anti-kickback statute is considered to be highly technical, health care 
providers can avoid becoming innocently ensnared in its technicalities by requesting 
an advisory opinion.  Under the HIPAA, the Secretary of the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) is required to issue advisory opinions in response to 
requests for guidance about whether a specific business arrangement violates the 
anti-kickback law.153  The Secretary must issue an advisory opinion within 60 days 
of the receipt of a request, and the opinion is binding on both the Secretary and the 
party requesting the opinion.154  Thus, if a health care professional is in doubt, he or 
she can quickly receive clarification about a proposed financial arrangement. 
Third, the heightened mens rea standard presents a very difficult burden on the 
government.  Because this standard requires proof that the person actually knew of 
the anti-kickback law, it is very difficult for the government to win a conviction.  
Since this standard grossly favors defendants, courts will likely rely on the Bryan 
decision as a more balanced definition of “willfully.”  Another reason that courts 
may find to reject the heightened standard is that it is unclear how much the person 
must know about the law.  In cases where this standard has been applied, courts have 
                                                                
151Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 669, 702 (“Doing or omitting to do a thing knowingly 
and willfully, implies not only a knowledge of the thing, but a determination with a bad intent 
to do it or to omit doing it”). 
152Bryan, 524 U.S. 184, 188 (1998). 
153Pub.L.No. 104-191, Title II, § 205, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).  Under the direction of the 
Attorney General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services will issue advisory opinions 
about (1) what constitutes prohibited remuneration under the anti-kickback laws; (2) whether 
an arrangement falls within one of the statutory exceptions to the anti-kickback law; (3) 
whether an arrangement falls within an applicable safe harbor established by the (OIG); (4) 
what constitutes an inducement to reduce or limit services; and (5) whether a particular 
activity constitutes grounds for penalties under the anti-kickback law, civil monetary law, or 
exclusion statutes.  The OIG must accept requests for advisory opinions between February 21, 
1997 and August 21, 2000.  Cited in Jost § 3-13. 
154Jost at §§ 3-13. 
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stated that the person must know something of the law, but is not required to know 
the specifics of the law.  Such an ambiguous standard will be difficult to apply where 
the facts do not present a clear picture of what a person knows. 
Fourth, the gun trafficing statute in Bryan is analogous to the anti-kickback 
statute in that both statutes include the mens rea terms “knowingly” and “willfully.”  
The Supreme Court defined both of these terms in Bryan, and noted that “willfully” 
requires more than “knowingly,” since the person must also know that the conduct is 
unlawful.155  This distinction is important because critics of the “middle standard” 
have argued that it proscribes the same conduct as knowingly, and therefore, courts 
have failed to recognize that it is a higher standard.156 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Bryan will likely have a dramatic 
influence on federal courts’ interpretation of the mens rea requirement under the 
Medicare and Medicaid anti-kickback statute.  Although the Bryan decision defined 
“willfully” under a different federal criminal statute, it has already been relied upon 
by the Eleventh Circuit court in interpreting the anti-kickback statute.  However, the 
Court was careful not to overrule the heightened mens rea standard it approved in 
Cheeks and Ratzlaf.  In so doing, the Court did not eliminate the possibility that the 
anti-kickback statute could be read as requiring a heightened standard, as the Ninth 
Circuit court did in Hanlester.  Therefore, Bryan will significantly influence the 
debate about the appropriate scienter requirement, but will not completely settle it.    
ROBB DEGRAW 
                                                                
155Bryan, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998). 
156See W. Bradley Tully, Supreme Court Defines “Willfully” to Require Knowledge that 
the Conduct is Illegal, 6 CAL. HEALTH L. MONITOR 2 (1998). 
